Case Studies of Attacks Against the Israeli Public Bus System
Bruce R. Butterworth
Shalom Dolev
Brian Michael Jenkins
This report presents 16 case studies of attacks planned or carried out against Israeli bus targets, along with statistical data on the number, frequency, and lethality of attacks against bus targets that have taken place in Israel since 1970 and during the Second Intifada, which occurred between September 2000 and the end of 2006. The statistical data come from MTI’s Database on Terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation. The report also includes an analysis of the effectiveness of different improvised explosive devices and methods of delivering them and raises questions for future discussion. The case studies of bus attacks were selected not because they are statistically representative, but because they provide a variety of interesting observations. They include both lethal and nonlethal attacks, attacks in which security measures were effective or were not followed or were ineffective, and attacks in which the attackers’ tactics and/or devices were lethal or failed or reduced the lethality of the attack. It is hoped that the cases presented in this report and the accompanying analysis will increase understanding of what can happen and of what can deter, prevent, and/or mitigate the occurrence of terrorist attacks against public bus systems.
Executive Summary
Public surface transportation has been and remains a primary target for terrorists throughout the world. The MTI Database on Terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation records 3,159 attacks against public surface transportation between January 1, 1970, and January 23, 2012, in which 7,997 people were killed and 30,046 were injured. Of these attacks, 47.4 percent were against buses, bus stations, and bus stops; they accounted for 55 percent of the fatalities and 41 percent of the injuries resulting from terrorist attacks during this period. Public bus transportation is particularly important in developing countries, and also in Israel—perhaps uniquely among developed countries. This report examines 16 of the
many attacks planned or carried out against the public bus system in Israel (including the West Bank and Gaza) during the period of intense rioting and civil unrest known as the Second Intifada, which lasted from September 2000 until it finally ended in the latter part of 2006.
The 16 cases described here were selected not because they are statistically representative, but because they provide a variety of interesting observations. They include both lethal and nonlethal attacks, attacks in which security measures were effective or were not followed or were ineffective, attacks in which the attackers’ tactics and/or devices were lethal or failed or reduced the lethality of the attack, and one planned attack that was eventually carried out against a non-bus target.
All the attacks took place between 2000 and 2005. Fourteen of them were attempts to bomb a bus; in two cases, bus stations were the targets.
Suicide delivery was the dominant method of attack: In 11 cases, devices were worn by or carried by the attacker; in two cases, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) was detonated by a suicide driver alongside a bus. In three cases, bombs were concealed in bags or other items left behind.
The two most lethal and successful attacks, one of which was a suicide VBIED attack, each killed 17 people. Among the other successful attacks, one killed 16 people, one killed 15, and one—the other suicide VBIED attack—killed 14. Six of the 15 actual attacks were considered unsuccessful, and five were considered partially successful. One case involved only preattack surveillance, with no attack.
In eight of the attacks that were considered failures or only partial successes, security
measures and awareness played a role in stopping the attack or mitigating its consequences. In nine of those same cases, poor attacker techniques and bomb-making were
also factors.
Of course, all of the cases raise questions. We do not attempt to answer these questions; rather, we pose them for further discussion. The most important question, particularly for security officials and transportation operators in the United States, is, How applicable are these cases to the current environment in the United States? Another question is, How does Israel’s experience compare with that of India, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka?
The United States, like many other developed countries, has not experienced successful terrorist attacks against public bus transportation. It may be that terrorists in the United States are not as capable or determined as those in other countries, their plots may have been interrupted by police and intelligence officials, they may not have chosen bus targets for lethal attacks, or they may not have focused extensively on public surface transportation. Israel faces, and has faced, a host of determined, constantly improving terrorist foes who have benefited from a relatively fast tempo of operations and a restive populace apparently willing to provide bombers and material support. At the same time, the Israeli traveling public is generally considered to be more in tune with security risks and more likely to be observant and to become involved than the traveling public in other countries, since the consequences of successful attacks are immediate and well known in a closely knit, small country.
While one might conclude that Western nations are not likely to experience the kinds of intense terrorist campaigns against public surface transportation experienced in Israel or in developing countries such as India, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka, these targets remain
attractive and must be considered in security planning.
It is hoped that the cases presented here and the accompanying analysis will increase understanding of what can happen and of what can deter, prevent, and/or mitigate the occurrence of terrorist attacks against public bus systems.
Read the full report here:
http://transweb.sjsu.edu/PDFs/research/2978-israeli-bus-public-transportation-attacks.pdf